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I. Barbara Is Not Guilty of Any "Oversights." 
Initially, the Personal Representative accuses Barbara of two "significant 
oversights." Appellee's Brief ("PR's Brf.") at 17-18. First, he asserts Barbara refused to 
discuss the amount of damages she sought below "to obscure . . . the unreasonableness of 
her interpretation of the Ante Nuptial Agreement." PR's Brf. at 17. If the Court reverses 
the trial court's interpretation of the Antenuptial Agreement, it will not award damages; it 
will remand so the trial court can determine the amount of damages. Kraatz v. Heritage 
Imports, 71 P.3d 188,475 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2003 UT App 201, %5 (Utah App. 2003). 
Thus, discussing damages at this stage is irrelevant. Moreover, even if Barbara's damage 
claim were patently unreasonable, that hardly means her interpretation of the Antenuptial 
Agreement is, a fortiori, unreasonable. Because the Personal Representative repeatedly 
makes this claim or variations of it (PR's Brf. at 6, 14, 24, 30, 35-39), and the accusation 
is false, Barbara responds to the substance of the claim in Addendum 1. As shown in the 
Addendum, the repeated claim that Barbara is seeking all of Louis' earnings during the 
marriage is false. PR's Brf. at 4, 27, 35, 37. She specifically asked the trial court to 
interpret acquired property as net of "ordinary and necessary living expenses." R. 1126. 
Second, the Personal Representative asserts that "throughout her brief/' Barbara 
falsely claims she received essentially nothing from the Agreement. PR's Brf. at 17-18, 
38-39. If true, it would be charitable to call that an oversight. While Barbara did in fact 
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receive very little from the Antenuptial Agreement,1 Barbara actually stated she received 
"essentially nothing" from paragraph 5 under the trial court's interpretation. Appellant's 
Brief ("B's Brf") at 5, 12. The Personal Representative claims that, under paragraph 5, 
Barbara received $15,000 from Louis before his death, $4,858.83 from a joint bank 
account, and $12,700.00 for a P.O.D. bank account. PR's Brf. at 11-12, 17. Barbara 
received the joint tenancy and P.O.D. accounts by operation of law (Utah Code §75-6-
104), and she received the $15,000 prior to Louis' death. She received none of these 
payments as the "surviving spouse" under paragraph 5 of the Antenuptial Agreement. 
II. Barbara's Interpretation of the Antenuptial Agreement Harmonizes all 
Provisions in the Agreement. 
A. The Eighth Recital Supports Barbara's Interpretation. 
The eighth Recital states: 
1
 Of the $350,000 the Personal Representative claims Barbara received under the 
Agreement (PR's Brf. at 15, 17, 38, 39), $307,000 was based on the Personal 
Representative's estate tax valuation of Barbara's life estate - a value with no relationship 
to the true value to Barbara. For her life estate, the trial court ordered her to pay "all 
taxes, maintenance costs, and the costs of insurance]." R.140. Barbara's 2004 tax notice 
sets the property taxes alone at over $12,000, a monthly charge of $1,000 plus. The 
Personal Representative's expert opined that the rental value of the home was $1,250 to 
$1,350 per month. Trial Exh. 34. Comparing these numbers shows that the benefit to 
Barbara is nearly offset by property taxes alone. See Addendum 2 (a copy of the tax 
notice); Trial Exh. 21 (Deed of Distribution). The total property tax value of the 
Highland Drive property is nearly $1,400,000. At a rental value of $1,350 per month, the 
value of the home constitutes only a small part of that value. As to the remaining 
amounts the Personal Representative claims Barbara received under paragraph 5, see the 
text following this footnote. 
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WHEREAS, Louis and Barbara are desirous of inter-marrying, but both 
wish to protect the interests of their heirs at law in and to the property 
acquired by the respective parties during their lives,.. „ 
The Personal Representative argues that "their heirs at law" should be interpreted as 
"their descendants." PR's Brf. at 28; see also at 14, 34, 40. This argument ignores the 
definition of "heir" and "heir at law." As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: 
Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word 'heir' as one who 
inherits or is entitled to succeed to the possession of property after the death 
of the owner. This is, we think, the natural and ordinary meaning of the 
word. This Court has held that 'An heir is a person on whom the law casts 
an estate upon the death of the owner of the property, and therefore a living 
person, strictly speaking, can have no heir.' 
Kale v. Forrest, 178 S.E.2d 622, 630 (N.C. 1971); see also Utah Code §75-1-201(21) 
(1998) (technical definition of "heir"); Matter of Estate ofFinlay, 430 Mich. 590, 601, 
424 N.W.2d 272, 277 (Mich. 1988) ("potential heirs and legatees have a mere expectancy 
interest"); State, ex rel Adult and Family Services Div. v. Bradley, 58 Or.App. 663, 670, 
650 P.2d 91, 95 (Or.App. 1982) ("potential heir has no cause of action until [the 
decedent's death]"). 
When Barbara and Louis signed the contract, their descendants were "potential 
heirs." When Barbara and Louis' children survived Louis, they became his heirs. Thus, 
Barbara's interpretation of paragraph 5 is consistent with this recital. 
Importantly, the Personal Representative falsely claims that his interpretation of 
this recital is consistent with the trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5. PR's Brf. at 
31-32. The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 5 as applying to property acquired 
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"together" means the survivor could still receive some of the property the decedent 
acquired during the marriage. Only by deleting paragraph 5 entirely from the agreement 
can the Personal Representative's interpretation of the eighth recital be correct. 
Finally, even if "heirs at law" was intended to mean just the parties' descendants, 
the operative terms of the Antenuptial Agreement control over an inconsistent recital. See 
Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So.2d 1209, at 1212-13 (Fla. App. 1999) (and cases cited 
therein); see also Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 431 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2001 UT App 
287, 33 P.3d 1078,1ffll3-16 (U t a h APP- 2 0 0 1 ) (ambiguous recital cannot vary 
unambiguous terms set forth in the "four corners of the contract"). 
Accordingly, the Eighth Recital is consistent with Barbara's interpretation of the 
unambiguous operative terms of the Agreement. 
B. "Acquired by the Parties" as Used in Paragraph 5 Means 
Acquisitions by Louis, Barbara or Both. 
This Court has twice used "acquired by the parties" to mean acquisitions by the 
husband, the wife, or both. In response, the Personal Representative noted in a footnote 
that the two cases Barbara cited were both divorce cases. PR's Brf. at 33, fn. 5. While 
true, Barbara would have cited these cases if they had been capital homicide cases, 
because they show the commonly understood meaning of "acquired by the parties." 
Noting that these cases are divorce cases only strengthens Barbara's position. Paragraph 
5 provides for the distribution of all property "acquired by the parties" in the event of a 
divorce, as well as in the event of survivorship. 
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While the Personal Representative cites relevant authority concerning the 
interpretation of contracts (PR's Brf. at 27, 31, 35), his arguments contradict that 
authority. PR's Brf. at 30-34. After emphasizing that the Court should interpret "what 
the parties said," should not "add" words to the Agreement, and should "giv[e] effect to 
all [words of the contract] and ignor[e] none," he, like the trial court below, proceeds to 
add words to the contract and ignore other provisions of the contract. In paragraph 5, 
after "acquired by the parties," the trial court added the word "together," while the 
Personal Representative prefers to add the word "jointly." R.1345; see PR's Brf. at 1, 6, 
14, 18, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 41, 43. Adding either word violates the very rule the Personal 
Representative cites. See also Barbara's discussion of Paragraph 9 in ILD below (where 
the Personal Representative makes wholesale additions to and basically rewrites that 
paragraph). 
C. The Personal Representative's Sidesteps the Issue 
regarding Paragraphs 1, 7 and 8. 
Regarding paragraph 1, the Personal Representative ignores the fact that paragraph 
1 does not require quit claim deeds for property acquired separately after the marriage, a 
gaping hole if the trial court's interpretation of Paragraph 5 is correct. PR's Brf. at 29; 
compare B's Brf. at 8. As to paragraphs 7 and 8, the Personal Representative again 
ignores the hole the trial court's interpretation leaves regarding the distribution of post 
marriage separately acquired property if there were simultaneous deaths. PR's Brf. at 32-
33. Nothing the Personal Representative argues about these paragraphs fills these holes 
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and the logical inference to be drawn from them. Barbara's interpretation leaves no holes 
in paragraphs 1, 7, and 8, thus "giving effect to all [provisions of the agreement] and 
ignoring none." PR's Brief at 27. 
D. The Personal Representative's Tortured Interpretation of 
Paragraph 9 Violates Utah Law, is Unworkable, and Is 
Contrary to His Administration of the Estate. 
In order to find a purpose for Paragraph 9 if Paragraph 5 only applies to property 
acquired "together," the Personal Representative states: 
[Pjaragraph 9 is needed precisely to distinguish between two types of 
property: the property that Lou and Barbara acquired jointly during the 
marriage with their earnings during the marriage—which passes to the 
survivor under paragraph 5, and any property they commingled or acquired 
together during the marriage with assets they owned prior to the 
marriage—which passes to the deceased's descendants under paragraph 1. 
PR's Brf. at 34 (emphasis in PR's Brf.) Paragraph 9 does not discuss property "acquired 
jointly with their earnings during the marriage" nor is there any reference to "property 
commingled or acquired together during the marriage with assets they owned prior to the 
marriage." Paragraph 9 states: 
In the event that either party to this Agreement should sell, convert or 
exchange any of the property owned by him or her prior to the marriage, 
then the proceeds of the sale from such sale or exchange or such other real 
or personal property acquired from such sale shall be deemed to be subject 
to this Agreement, not as property acquired during the marriage, but as 
substitute property owned by the party prior to the marriage. 
Trial Exh. 1 at 3, f 9. The Personal Representative simply is rewriting this paragraph. 
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Based on the Personal Representative's "interpretation," if Louis died with jointly 
owned property, absent a complete set of financial records since the date of the marriage 
for both Louis and Barbara, no one would know whether an asset was acquired "jointly 
with their earnings during the marriage" rather than "commingled or acquired together 
during the marriage with assets they owned prior to the marriage." Even with those 
records, resolving this manufactured issue would likely be laborious and expensive. 
Finally, the Personal Representative argues Barbara received joint tenancy and 
P.O.D. bank accounts under paragraph 5 of the agreement without any discussion of how 
Barbara "acquired [the monies in those accounts] jointly with [Louis' and her] earnings 
during the marriage." PR's Brf. at 14. In fact, Barbara testified she did not contribute to 
either of those accounts. T.93; compare Exhibit 2 at 3 ^ 9 (listing Lou's bank accounts at 
death). If the Personal Representative truly thought his interpretation of Paragraph 9 was 
accurate, he would have been battling to get even these assets back from Barbara. 
Barbara's interpretation is straightforward, leaves no holes, gives effect to all 
paragraphs of the agreement, uses the natural meaning of the words, and does not require 
any additional words nor any revision of the text of the agreement. Thus, Barbara asks 
the Court to adopt her interpretation. Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
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E. The Antenuptial Agreement's Use of "The Parties", "Each 
Party", and "Either Party" Does Not Change this 
Analysis. 
The Personal Representative argues that this Court should infer that Louis and 
Barbara used the term "the parties" to mean "the parties together" "advisedly" because 
they also used the terms "each party," the "respective parties [or estates]," and "either 
party" in the agreement. PR's Brf. at 28-34. "An inference is reasonable if and only if it 
implies the existence of an element more likely than the nonexistence of that element. A 
reasonable inference is one that is more likely than not." Block v. Golden Eagle Ins. 
Corp., 2004 WL 1700067 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004). As this Court's opinions in Jefferies 
and Elman illustrate, "acquired by the parties" means acquisitions by either or both 
parties. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah App.1995); Elman v. Elman, 45 
P.3d 176,443 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 2002 UT App 83, ^[38-39 (Utah App. 2002). These 
cases, and Barbara's careful analysis of the paragraphs 1, 5, 7, 8 and 9 (B's Brf. at 7-12), 
show that the proposed inference, if logical at all, is far less likely that the actual usage 
made of the term "acquired by the parties" by this Court. 
F. Barbara Properly Analyzed the Reasonableness of Her 
Interpretation. 
Responding to Barbara's analysis of the reasonableness of her interpretation given 
her twenty-three year marriage to Louis, the Personal Representative argues: "The Ante 
Nuptial Agreement says nothing about rewarding one spouse for staying married to the 
other or compensating a spouse for the length of the marriage." PR's Brf. at 40. Barbara 
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did not claim the Antenuptial Agreement "said" that; rather, that is the effect of her 
interpretation of paragraph 5 and that is a reasonable and worthy result. B's Brf. at 13. 
In addition, Barbara also claimed her interpretation was reasonable because she 
gave up a $325.00 annuity in return for Louis' promises in the agreement. B's Brf. at 12. 
The Personal Representative argued she gave no record citation to support that statement. 
PR's Brf. at 38. Barbara provided the record citations for this fact in her Statement of 
Facts. B's Brf. at 4. 
G. The Parties Course of Conduct and Louis5 Will Are 
Irrelevant to the Interpretation of the Agreement. 
Since the trial court ruled the Antenuptial Agreement is unambiguous (R.1345), 
the Personal Representative's discussion (PR's Brf. at 10-11,41-42) of how Louis and 
Barbara conducted their financial affairs after the execution of the contract is irrelevant. 
Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 19 P.3d 392, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 2001 UT App 
35, %9 (Utah App. 2001) (course of conduct cannot vary terms of unambiguous contract); 
Howard O. Hunter, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 8:6. - Course of Performance 
Between Parties (2003) ("Evidence of the parties1 course of conduct... is admissible 
only when the written contract is not clear" . . . . ) . Moreover, it is contrary to Barbara's 
testimony, Trial Exhibit 9, and the undisputed fact that Louis died with a joint bank 
account with Barbara. T.62; Trial Exh. 9 (showing two earlier joint bank accounts); Trial 
Exh. 2 at 4, Tjl 1. Likewise, the Personal Representative's discussion of Louis' Will is 
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irrelevant. PR's Brf. at 36-38, 42-43.2 Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing 
Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, ^ 10, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2004 UT 54 (Utah 2004) ("If 
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous ... a court determines 
the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of 
law.") In any event, Louis could not change the meaning of the Antenuptial Agreement 
by his unilateral execution of a will. Thus, the Court should disregard the Personal 
Representative's arguments on these points. 
III. Barbara's Claims are Superior to those of Louis' Children. 
A. Barbara is Entitled to Assert her Claims as a Creditor. 
Regarding Barbara's claim that she is a creditor, the Personal Representative 
focuses solely on whether she properly presented her claim. PR's Brf. at 19-24. 
Significantly, he did not respond to the Kansas Supreme Court's decision holding that a 
testator's direction to pay a creditor extinguishes the obligation to present a claim. 
Jordan v. Young et al, 84 P.2d 970, 971-72 (Kansas 1938). B'sBrf. at 14. Likewise, he 
did not address the "law of the case" doctrine and the unfairness of allowing the Personal 
Representative to use the agreement to limit and defeat Barbara's rights while preventing 
Barbara from asserting her rights as a creditor under the same agreement. B's Brf. at 15-
2
 The Personal Representative argues will and contract principles interchangeably. 
PR's Brf. at 36-38, 42-43. In ruling that Barbara's rights were as a devisee, the trial court 
expressly held that Barbara's rights as a devisee would be based on her rights under the 
Antenuptial Agreement. T.89. Thus, contract principles are the controlling authority. 
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16. The Court could hold Barbara a creditor, entitled to a creditor's preference in the 
payment of her claim, on either basis. 
Regarding presentation, the Personal Representative inaccurately asserts: "Of these 
required elements [the basis of the claim, the name and address of the claimant, and the 
amount claimed], the Ante Nuptial Agreement includes at most Barbara's name." PR's 
Brf. at 20-21. Delivery of the Antenuptial Agreement to the Personal Representative's 
counsel, in conjunction with the will's direction to pay Barbara "per the terms of our anti 
(sic) nuptial agreement dated March 25, 1976" established the basis of her claim. T.72-
73. Indeed, it was sufficient to allow the Personal Representative to participate in a 
mediation in October 2000 (11 months after Louis died). T.70. The Personal 
Representative already knew Barbara's address. See R.2 (his initial petition for probate). 
The only element missing was the "amount of the claim." While that is a 
requirement under the statute, this Court has rejected the kind of strict construction the 
Personal Representative advocates: 
The statute disavows undue precision in the framing of such claims by 
concluding with the statement that "[fjailure to describe correctly the 
security, the nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not yet 
due does not invalidate the presentation made." In addition, the statement 
of purpose prefacing Utah's Probate Code provides that "the code shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies," which include "[t]o discover and make effective the interest [sic] 
of a decedent in distribution of his property...." Finally, § 75-3-804 
provides that instead of presenting a claim to a personal representative, a 
claimant may commence an action against the estate.. . . Such an action 
would be commenced by filing a complaint, which complaint would only 
need to be sufficiently definite and precise to comply with the liberal 
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requirements of notice pleading. See Utah R.Civ.P. 8(a). It would be 
anomalous to conclude that a claimant who opts for the less formal method 
of asserting a claim pursuant to § 75-3-804 must give more detailed notice 
than would be required in an adequate complaint. 
Dementas v. Estate ofTallas, By and Through First Sec. Bank, 764 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citations omitted). Barbara could not have known the amount of her claim 
when she delivered the Antenuptial Agreement to the Personal Representative's counsel. 
Finally, no where does the Personal Representative claim he was prejudiced by 
Barbara's failure to follow the precise terms of the claims presentation statute. He 
certainly knew enough to participate in mediation (T.70-71) and to use the agreement to 
his advantage. R.85-99. Thus, Barbara asks the Court to order that she be treated as a 
creditor of the estate. 
B. Even If Barbara Is Not a Creditor, She Is a Devisee and 
Can Assert Her Rights and Preferences under the 
Antenuptial Agreement as a Devisee. 
In his argument regarding Barbara's status as a creditor, the Personal 
Representative makes an argument not made below. He argues that finding that 
Barbara's claim as a creditor is time-barred for lack of presentation is sufficient alone to 
affirm the trial court. PR's Brf. at 24. At the trial, however, his counsel argued: 
I'll respond just briefly, your Honor. We are not saying that there's not an 
antenuptial agreement. We're not saying that the plaintiff is not making 
claims with respect to the antenuptial agreement. She's been doing that all 
along. As Mr. Kanell said in his memorandum in connection with the 
motion for summary judgment, she was pursuing that claim as — or that she 
was proceeding as a beneficiary. 
Page 12 
T.87. The trial court thereafter ruled that Barbara could proceed only as a devisee. T.88-
90. There is no time bar to the rights of a beneficiary. Thus, even if Barbara is not a 
creditor, she can still seek a devise equal to her rights under the Antenuptial Agreement. 
T.90. 
C. Barbara's Claims as a Creditor or Devisee Are Superior 
to Louis5 Children's Claims. 
If Barbara is a creditor, the Personal Representative breached the agreement when 
he failed to pay her the amounts she was due. As a creditor, she is entitled to payment of 
damages from Louis' estate for breach of contract against Louis' estate regardless of 
what his will stated or whether he named P.O.D. beneficiaries to his accounts. Moreover, 
as a party to the contract, Barbara can seek damages from Louis' premarital property 
notwithstanding paragraph 1 of the Antenuptial Agreement and its direction in favor of a 
non-party. Compare PR's Brf. at 25-26, 35-36 with Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 
P.3d 193, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2004 UT 28, ^ 22 (Utah 2004) ("breaching party . . . has 
no right to enforcement of the [contract]"). 
Even if Barbara is only a devisee under the will, and not a creditor of Louis' estate, 
where Louis stated she "is to receive per the terms of our anti (sic) nuptial agreement 
dated March 25, 1976 . . ." as one of his "just debts," Louis is acknowledging that her 
right to payment comes before any of his other beneficiaries. Trial Exh. 4 at 1. Indeed, 
the Personal Representative acknowledged that Barbara is entitled to preferential 
treatment as a devisee: 
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[B]y incorporating Barbara's entitlements . . . into his Will, Lou also 
demonstrated his intent that the distribution of "all my property" to his 
children would not deprive Barbara of a distribution under the Ante Nuptial 
Agreement. 
PR's Brf. at 43. See also R.33-39 (Personal Representative's motion to declare Barbara's 
interest in the marital home a life estate, notwithstanding devise of "all my property" to 
his children). 
IV. Utah Code §75-3-703 Supports Barbara's Claim That the Trial Court 
Abused its Discretion in Not Recovering Estate Property Whose 
Distribution Jeopardized Her Right to Payment. 
The Personal Representative argues that Barbara ignored Utah Code Section 75-3-
703 and its direction that the Personal Representative "settle and distribute the estate . . . 
in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will." PR's Brf. at 24-26. 
Because the trial court cited that section in its ruling, Barbara simply argued the 
application of that section to the facts. B's Brf. at 20. The will authorizes distributions 
only "after all just debts" have been paid. Trial Exh. 4 at 1 (emphasis added). Where 
Barbara's creditor's claim was pending, the Personal Representative improperly 
distributed all of Louis' remaining real estate to Louis' children and jeopardized the 
payment of Barbara's claim. Since the children had previously appeared in the estate 
proceedings (see e.g., R.808, appearance of Margaret Olson for heir), they actively 
opposed the motion and were and are subject to the trial court's jurisdiction. R.959-967 
(opposition memorandum filed by Margaret Olson for Louis' children). 
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Section 75-3-1006 precludes an action against a distributee for the recovery of 
estate property one year after the date of an improper distribution. Utah Code §75-3-
1006(l)(b)(ii). Barbara brought her motion to recover this property within two months of 
the distribution. R.912-41; Trial Exh. 21. However, if the Court affirms the trial court's 
denial of her motion to recover this property, but it reverses its interpretation of the 
Antenuptial Agreement, Barbara would be left in the incongruous position of having a 
valid claim against the estate, but not being able to pursue the improperly distributed 
property because any new action to recover that property after an award of damages 
would be time-barred. Thus, Barbara asks the Court to vacate this Minute Entry and 
direct the trial court to reconsider her motion to recover this property after setting 
damages in the case. 
V. Barbara Preserved Her Claim That the Personal Representative's 
Waiver Should Be Enforced. 
Responding to Barbara's waiver claim, the Personal Representative argues that 
Barbara failed to preserve her objection because she did not appeal the Court's April 5, 
2004 minute (denying her Objection to the form of the April 5th Order). PR's Brf. at 44-
46. Barbara formally objected to the form of the proposed Order solely on the basis of its 
failure to address the Personal Representative's waiver. Further, she submitted a 
proposed Order that recognized and approved the waiver. R. 1317-33. The Court denied 
her objection in its April 5th minute entry and entered the objectionable Order on that 
same date. R1340-48; 1349-50. Barbara then appealed that Order. R. 1366-67. Barbara 
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clearly raised the issue at trial. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). She 
has properly appealed the Order that was entered over her objection. 
In a footnote, the Personal Representative claims that, because the estate is the 
owner of all Louis5 personal property, Barbara has the burden to claim what property in 
her possession is hers. PR's Brf. at 45, fn. 8. Even if this bald assertion were true, and it 
is not (B's Brf. at 17-20), as the owner of the property, the estate can still waive its right 
to ownership. Whether it waived its claim to recover the property or its ownership of the 
property, the Estate did so in open court. Barbara simply asks this Court to enforce that 
waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Barbara asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court and direct 
it: 
a. To rule that Barbara is a creditor of the estate; 
b. To rule that, under the Antenuptial Agreement, Barbara is entitled to all 
property acquired by Louis during the marriage; 
c. To calculate Barbara's damages based on that interpretation and the 
evidence adduced at trial. 
d. To enforce the Personal Representative's waiver of his claim for personal 
property made in open court and to limit the award of personal property to the items 
(eight in total) identified in court (other than "various tools in the shop"); and 
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e. To reconsider whether the distribution made in May 2003 should be 
recovered after calculating the damages to which Barbara is entitled as a creditor. 
Dated this jfUday of September, 2004. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac 
H \CHARLESB\CMB\PLEADINGS ETC\UZELAC-APPEAL-REPLY-BRIEF-FINAL 
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Addendum 1 
Barbara's Damage Claim 
In his brief, the Personal Representative argues that Barbara's damage claim shows 
that her interpretation of the Antenuptial Agreement is unreasonable. PR's Brf. at 6, 14, 
17, 24, 30, 35-39. In particular, he claims that Barbara's interpretation of paragraph 5 
"would require distribution to her of all of Lou's earnings, even if Lou no longer held 
these earnings at his death." PR's Brf. at 35 (emphasis in PR's Brf), see also Id. at 4, 
27, 37. In contrast, Barbara argued in her post trial brief: 
While the language of paragraph 5 might literally be applied to all 
acquisitions, Barbara believes it is illogical and unfair not to reduce the 
acquisitions by the payments that Louis and Barbara made during their 
marriage for their ordinary and necessary living expenses. Barbara never 
anticipated that she would receive property that she and Louis had spent for 
their living expenses. Accordingly, Barbara believes that the Court should 
interpret "property acquired" to mean that property less Louis' and her 
ordinary and necessary living expenses. As explained below, there is a 
straightforward way to calculate this amount. 
R. 1126. Thus, Barbara argued: 
To determine the value of the property that Louis acquired during the 
marriage, Barbara believes that the most logical starting point is to value 
Louis' assets at the time of the marriage, value his assets at his death, and 
calculate the difference. 
R.1137. See also R.1072-74, (Barbara's Pre Trial Brief making the same point). 
Barbara argued for one exception to this straightforward methodology. 
Based on the Supreme Court's analysis of the post nuptial agreement in 
Peirce v. Peirce, if Louis made substantial gifts during the marriage, the 
value of that property should be included in the calculation of the value of 
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the property Louis acquired during the marriage. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 
193, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7 (2000). Those gifts represent 
acquisitions during the marriage that were not used for ordinary and 
necessary living expenses. 
If these transfers are not added into the calculation as property acquired 
during the marriage, the [Antenuptial Agreement] would be illusory. In 
Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7 (2000), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a husband's promise to leave his wife his 
"estate" in a post nuptial agreement would be illusory if the lower court's 
interpretation that husband could give away his property before death were 
followed. In order to avoid that result, the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court and concluded that the postnuptial agreement contained an implied 
term that the husband would not make substantial gifts and defeat his wife's 
legitimate expectations under the agreement. Id. at ffl[24-28. "Thus, we 
conclude that the agreement included limitations upon [husband's] ability to 
give away substantial portions of his property, as circumscribed by the 
fiduciary duty and mutual trust that governs postnuptial agreements." Id. at 
H28. 
R.1139-40. 
In a footnote, the Personal Representative falsely states that Barbara counted all 
gifts over $100. PR's Brf. at 36, fn.6. Instead, Barbara argued: 
In Trial Exh. 11, Barbara established that Louis made birthday gifts to his 
children from 1992 to 1999 that ranged from $100 in some years to $35.00 
or $40.00 in other years. Barbara believes that these birthday presents, as 
well as Christmas gifts, family dinners, and similar items are part of normal 
family life and should properly be considered ordinary and necessary living 
expenses. In comparison, Barbara identified gifts that are substantial in 
nature in Trial Exh. 12. 
Trial Exhibit 12 identified the "substantial gifts." The smallest gifts identified 
were for $350.00 and $450.00 respectively. Those gifts were included because of Louis' 
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handwritten notes on the 12th page of Trial Exhibit 12. Otherwise, all gifts were $1,000 
or more. 
Finally, with the exception of the claim regarding "substantial gifts," Barbara 
relied entirely on stipulated and undisputed facts. See Exhibit 2. She summarized her 
claim as follows: 
Date 
11/6/99 
11/4/99 
11/6/99 
11/6/99 
11/6/99 
Various 
4/14/76 
| 12/18/01 
Asset 
Stipulated value of financial Accounts on date of death; 
Trial Exhibit 2, Stipulation re Facts, \9 at 3-4 
Less $15,000 payment received by Barbara on this date; 
Trial Exhibit 2, Stipulation re Facts, ^ [1 1 at 4 
Assets received by Barbara from Louis (the First Security 
Bank P.O.D. Account); Trial Exhibit 2, Stipulation re 
Facts, f 10 at 4. 
Obligation to pay Barbara $5,000 in insurance3 
Stocks, value on date of death; Trial Exhibit 2, Stipulation, 
112 at 4-5 
Substantial gifts during marriage; see Trial Exhibit 12 
Stipulated value of financial accounts at date of marriage; 
Stipulation, ^3 at 2 
Stipulated offsets; Stipulation, ^16 at 6-74 
Value 
$ 277,716.00 
$ -15,000.00 
$ -12,700.00 
$ 5,000.00 1 
$ 35,951.43 
$ 59,086.22 
$ -52,012.43 
$ -4,721.13 
3
 Although the trial court granted summary judgment on the insurance issue, it did 
so on the basis that Louis provided this benefit as part of the $12,700 P.O.D. account 
payment. Since Louis was required under paragraph 5 to leave the $12,700 as part of the 
"property acquired" during the marriage, he could not also use that money to pay Barbara 
her right to $5,000 in insurance. Thus, Barbara remains entitled to the insurance 
proceeds. See Antenuptial Agreement, <|2 at 2, 
4
 Following trial, Barbara paid these offsets. R. 1311. 
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Date Asset 
TOTAL 
Value 
$ 293,320.09 
R. 1140-41. 
Barbara's calculation of damages is "the most direct, practical and accurate 
method that can be employed." Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, 784 P.2d 475, 
478 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). Even if the trial court ultimately denies 
damages for the "substantial gifts" identified in Trial Exhibit 12, given the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Peirce v. Peirce, Barbara has acted reasonably in seeking those 
damages. 
For these reasons, if Barbara's damage claim is relevant to her interpretation of the 
Antenuptial Agreement, her damage claim, like her interpretation of the agreement, is 
reasonable, fair, and based on Utah law. 
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Addendum 2 
Current Property Tax Notice for Life Estate Property 
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* 2004 NOTICE OF PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAX CHANGE * 
CURRENT AND PROPOSED PROPERTY TAXES 
*ALT LAKE COUNTY 
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET #N~3300, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84190-1100 
MARKET VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
THIS IS NOT A BILL 
DO NOT PAY 
PARCEL NO 22-15-103-005-0000 TAX DISTRICT 82 
TYPE 111 SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE 
ASSESSED TO MAGERAS, SUSAN B, ET AL 
MAGERAS SUSAN B, ET AL 
C/O BARBARA UZELAC 
PO BOX 17144 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
% ry 
PROPERTY LOCATION 
5559 S HIGHLAND DR 
\ND DESCRIPTION ACRES 2 00 
(THE APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION IS AVAILABLE 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER) 
PROPERTY TYPE 
ASSESSED 
PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL LAND 
SECONDARY RES/C0M/IND LAND 
PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL BLDG 
TOTAL $ 
LAST YEAR'S (2003) 
MARKET VALUE 
147,620 
141,740 
60,200 
349,560 
THIS YEAR'S (2004) 
MARKET VALUE 
500,020 
387,080 
1,000 
888 ,1 OO @@ 
IMPROVED RESIDENTIAL SALES IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD (COMPILED BY THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR) 
ABOVE GRADE SQUARE 
FOOTAGE OF THIS PARCEL 847 
AVERAGE ABOVE GRADE 
SQUARE FOOTAGE 3 386 
AVERAGE 
SALES PRICE $ 
LOW 
SALES PRICE $ 
HIGH 
SALES PRICE $ 
TAXING 
ENTITIES 
TAX LAST 
YEAR (2003) 
TAX THrS YEAR IF 
NO BUDGET CHANGE 
TAX IF PROPOSED 
BUDGET \PPRO\FD A PUBLIC BUDGET MEETING WILL BE HELD 
UNIFORM SCHOOL FUND 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
GRANITE SCHOOL DIS JUDGE 
GRANITE SCHOOL BASIC 
3RANITE SCHOOL BASIC JDG 
'SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JUDGE 
.HOLLADAY CITY !H0LLADAY CITY JUDGEMENT lSL COUNTY LIBRARY [SL COUNTY LIBRARY JUDGE 
ISO SL VALLEY MOSQUITO !S0 SL VAl LEY MOSQUITO JDG 
'SLC SUB SANITARY 
'SLC SUB SANITARY JUDGE 
CENTRAL UT WATER CONSERV 
CENTRAL UT WATER JUDGE 
iMULTICNTY ASSESS/COL LEVY 
MULTICO ASSESS/COL LV JDG 
CNTY ASSESS/COLL LEVY 
CNTY ASSESS/COLL LEVY JDG 
00 
,258 44 
00 
467 27 
00 
655 21 
00 
553 56 
00 
191 26 
00 
8 71 
00 
64 52 
00 
91 66 
00 
46 34 
00 
32 79 
00 
00 
3,197 24 
00 
1,192 75 
00 
1,663 89 
00 
1,353 78 
00 
485 72 
00 
21 87 
00 
161 02 
00 
233 91 
00 
119 28 
00 
82 83 
00 
TOTAL PROPERTY TAX 5 3,369.76 
1 
1 
00 
,277 42 
00 
,192 75-
00! 
1,663 911 
00 
,353 78! 
001 
485 72 
00 
21 87 
00 
02 
00 
233 91 
00 
119 28 
00 
82 81 
00 
161 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
AUG 31
 r 2004 7 PM 3 4 0 E 3545 S 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
8,512.29| j 8,592.47V@ SEE BELOW 
* TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE PERSONAL PROPERTY, G^KBSGE FEES, OR OTFfER ATTACHMENTS** 
****PROPERTY TAX RELIEF AS EXPLAINED IN THIS PACKET IS NOT SHOWN ON THIS NOTICE**** 
@@ THE 2004 MARKET VALUE SHOWN ON THIS NOTICE IS THE RESULT OF AN ANNUAL VALUE UPDATE 
• JUDGEMENT LEVIES REPRESENT LEGISLATIVE OPTION FOR PAYMENT OF TAX REFUNDS TO LARGE TAXPAYERS 
ILLLL.ILJIL.IILnMll.LLLLLI.LLUI 
**********AUT0** 5.QIQI7 84117 
#BWNBNLQ 
#221510300500004# 
MAGERAS, SUSAN B; ET AL B3 045266 
C/O BARBARA UZELAC 
PO BOX 17144 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117-0144 
S VLT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EQL \LIZATION -
IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLE \SE READ CAREFLLLY 
\ppe \\b of'he value shown hereon should be filed wi'h the Counrv 
Boaid ot Equalization within 45 da\s of mailing but not later than 
09/30/04 
Appeals need to be filed according to the information and 
detailed instructions enclosed with this notice 
^EE REVERSE FOR EXPLANATIONS AND INSTRLCTIONS FOR THIS NOTICE KhD FILING REQUIREMENTS AND DEADLINES 
* 2004 NOTICE OF PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAX CHANGE * 
CURRENT AND PROPOSED PROPERTY TAKES 
SALT LAKF COUNTY 
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET #N-3300, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84190-1100 
THIS IS NOT A BILL 
DO NOT PAY 
MARKET VAL UE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
PARCEL NO 22-15-103-006-0000 TAX DISTRICT 82 
TYPE 111 SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE 
ASSFSSFDTO MAGERAS SUSAN B.ETAL 
1 <^V uX-
MAGERAS SUSAN B, ETAL v ^ 
C/O BARBARA UZELAC 
PO BOX 17144 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
PROPERTY LOC \T ION 
5561 S HIGHLAND DR 
\ N D DESCRIPTION ACRES 1 0 0 
(THE APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION IS AVAILABLE 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER) 
1 PROPERTY TYPE 
ASSESSED 
| PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL LAND 
PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL BLDG 
AGRICULTURAL BLDG 
TOTAL $ 
LAST YEAR'S (2003) 
MARKET VALUE 
147 600 
231,620 
3,050 
382,270 
| THIS YEARS (2004) 
I MARKET VALUE ' 
482 300 I 
2,250 
2,440 
486,990 @@l 
l IMPROVED RESIDENTIAL SALES IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD (COMPILED BY THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR) ^ J 
ABOVE GRADE SQUARE AVERAGE ABOVE GRADE 
[FOOTAGE OF THIS PARCEL 2 380 [SQUARE FOOTAGE 3 386 
TAXING 
ENTITIES 
UNIFORM SCHOOL FUND 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(GRANITE SCHOOL DIS JUDGE 
I GRANITE SCHOOL BASIC 
GRANITE SCHOOL BASIC JDG 
'SALT LAKE COUNTY 
jSALT LAKE COUNTY JUDGE 
H0LLADAYCITY 
!H0LLADAY CITY JUDGEMENT 
!SL COUNTY LIBRARY 
»SL COUNTY LIBRARY JUDGE 
iSOSL VALLEY MOSQUITO 
'SO SL VALLEY MOSQUITO JDG 
|SLC SUB SANITARY 
SLC SUB SANITARY JUDGE 
(CENTRAL UT WATER C0NSERV 
'CENTRAL UT WATER JUDGE 
MULTICNTY ASSESS/COL LEVY 
MULTIC0 ASSESS/COL LV JDG 
,CNTY ASSESS/COLL LEVY 
CNTY ASSESS/COLL LEVY JDG 
i 
i 
i 
I 
rOT VL PROPERTY T \ X S 
TAX LAST I 
1
 YEAR (2003) 
00) 
1,040 121 
00 
386 211 
00 
541 53! 
00! 
457 52| 
ool 158 08 
00 
7 20 
OOl 
53 33! 
00| 
75 76! 
OOl 
38 30I 
AVERAGE 
SALES PRICE $ 
T \X THIS YEAR IF 
NO BUDGET CHANGE 
00 
1,297 65 
00 
484 10 
00 
675 33 
00 
549 45 
00 
197 13 
00 
8 88 
00 
65 35 
00 
94 94 
00 
48 41 
OOs 00 
27 09! 
00 
2J85.14J 
33 59 
00 
3,454JB3 
| T^XIFPROPOSLD 
! BUDGET \PPRO\ED 
00 
1,330 19 
00 
484 10 
00 
LOW 
I SALES PRICE $ J 
HIGH 
SALES PRICE $ 
A PUBLIC BUDGET MEETING WILL BE HELD] 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
AUG 31 2004 7 PM 340 E 3545 S 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR I 
675 321 
00 DID NOT LEW THIS YEAR 
549 45 
00 
197 13 
00 
8 88 
00 
65 35 
00 
94 94 
00 
48 41 
00 
33 60 
00 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
D«D NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
DID NOT LEVY THIS YEAR 
/ 3,487.377 @ SEE BELOW FOR JUDGEMENT LEVIES | 
I **TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE PERSONAL P R 0 P E R T ^ 8 a « B A f f l f FEES, OR OTHER ATTACHMENTS* * 1 
, ****PROPERT\ TAX RELIEF AS EXPLAINED IN THIS PACKET IS NOT SHOWN ON THIS NOTICE**** 
i @@ THE 2004 MARKET VALUE SHOWN ON THIS NOTICE IS THE RESULT OF AN ANNUAL VALUE UPDATE 
1 @ JUDGEMENT LEVIES REPRESENT LEGISLATIVE OPTION FOR PAYMENT OF TAX REFUNDS TO LARGE TAXPA\ ERS 
! 1 
lluI..I..Iu.ll..,!II...I!lu,...il.l..!.l..l.l..l.!,.I..i.l( 
**w*******AUT0** 5.DIGIT 84117 
#BWNBNLQ 
#221510300600003# 
MAGERAS, SUSAN B; ET AL 
C/O BARBARA UZELAC 
PO BOX 17144 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117-0144 
S\LTLVKEC01NTY BOARD Ol EQUALIZATION 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION-PLEASE RE VD CAREFULLY 
Appc us of the v ilut shown hereon should be tiled vith the Countv 
Board ol Equalization within 4i da\s ol mailing but not later than 
B3 045267 
09/30/04 
/-i—-"""" Appeals need to be filed according to the information and 
J7 / , ll/& CL 2-$ detailed inductions -nclosed with this notic° 
>EE REVERSE FOR E \ / L \N ATIONS \ND INSTRLCTIONS FOR THIS NOTICE AND FILING REQUIREMENTS AND DE XDLINES 
iWrfoOO, 
